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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

-vs.ANGELO JOE TELLAY,
Defendant.

Case No. 8731

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

Angelo Joe Tellay was convicted of the crime of
burglary in the second degree on February 20th, 1957,
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and sentenced
to a term in the State Penitentiary by the Honorable
::\fartin l\1. Larson, the Judge of said court, for a term
of not less than one nor more than twenty years. The
pertinent facts involved in this case may be stated as
follows: That on June, the lOth, 1956, the defendant and
his wife, Viola Tellay, called on a Mr. and Mrs. Rojas
in the morning of said day, and continued to have a party
on said day, during which time beer was drunk by Mr.
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and Mrs. Tellay, and Mr. and Mrs. Roja.s, and two other
friends, a Mr. and Mrs. Magerrin. The party continued
all day, which happened to be Sunday, and the evidenc~
is that the only intoxicant that was consumed by the participants was beer. That the defendant, together with
the other members of the party, had a buffet
supper at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Rojas in the evening
of said day, and thereafter went out to buy more beer.
It appears that the defendant and his wife, Viola Tellay,
had been arguing and quarreling in the afternoon and
continued to do so while riding in the panel truck owned
by Mr. Magerrin, who was driving the truck on the trip
to buy more beer, and near the Star Brass Foundry, on
8th South and 4th West, the car stopped and the defendant and ~Irs. Tellay got out. Mrs. Tellay stopped on the
west side of said foundry on 4th \Y est. Mrs. Tellay
testified that when they got out of the car she ripped the
shirt off her husband, the defendant herein, (R. 83, line
30) .and continued to argue with him on the street, and a
l\fr. William Langford was sworn and testified for the
State to the effect that on June lOth, 1956, he was employed by the American Fence Company as a salesman,
and by the American Galvanizing Cmnpany .as a night
watchn1an, and that the location of the American Galvanizing is at 513 West 8th South; that he resides at 471
West 8th South, just ea.st of the Star Brass Foundry;
that on the night of June lOth, 1956, he had observed
a person tprough the light shining through from the west
side of the building, who was moving about inside said
Star Brass Foundry, and he thereafter immediately called
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the police (R. 3G, line 30), and soon thereafter called Mr.
George Thomas McGrath, Vice-President of the Star
Bras.s Foundry & Refining Company, who went immediately to said Foundry. Mr. l\1cGrath himself testified
that his company had just purchased some metal from
Hill Field Air Base, which was at that time inside the
foundry, and its value would be between $2500.00 and
$3000.00, (R. 13 lines 11 to 13 inclusive). That the metals
purchased from the Hill Field Air Base were brass castings, weighing about 20 pounds each, and that there were
500 of them purchased. (R. 24, 29 to R. 25, 4). In response
to the telephone call placed by Langford, police officer
Clarence Leonard Stenstrud, and his colleague, Officer
Leo Johnson, drove to the Star Br.ass Foundry and found
a woman standing under the tree at the north west corner
of said foundry, who was later identified as Viola Tellay,
the wife of the defendant; that a noise was heard inside
of the foundry building, and that the defendant came out
of a broken window in the presence of the officers, and
was put under arrest. There is no evidence that the
defendant took any property within the Star Brass
Foundry. 11r. ).IcGrath, the Vice-President of said
Foundry, testified that nothing was taken from their
building (R. 25, 24 to 30).
At the time the defendant was .arrested, several police
officers had arrived on the scene, including two plain
clothes officers. There is some evidence produced by the
state to the effect that the lock on the west door of the
foundry building had been broken (R. 21, lines 24 to 29
inclusive). An information was filed against the defend-
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ant on the 13th day of July, 1956, charging him with
burglary in the second degree, as follows: "That on or
.about the lOth day of June, 1956, the said Angelo Joe
Tellay, entered the building of the Star Brass Foundry
& Refining Company, a Corporation, in the night time,
with the intent to commit larceny therein." To which
information the defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
There is evidence to the effect that the defendant
had been drinking beer all day long on the day of the
alleged offense, and was under the influence of alcohol.
(R. 84, 30; R. 85, 1 and 2). There is evidence to the effect that the defendant and his wife were going to
Denver, Colorad'o, and that the party held at Roj.a's
residence was a farewell party, given in their behalf
( R. 8:2: 17, 18). There is evidence to the effect, on behalf
of the state, that a crow bar, or pry bar, was found
within the Star Br.ass Foundry building, and was entered
into evidence (R. :23; 20-30). The defendant objected to
the introduction of said bar on the grounds that it had
not been properly identified, (R. Sl, lines 13 to 20 inclusive). A 1notion was n1ade on behalf of the defense
to disn1iss the action on the grounds that the state had
failed to prove the crin1e of burglary (R. 81-5 to 11 inclu~ivP, and R. 97, 2-t to :26 inclusive), which motion was
denied by the court (R.97, line :2/). The defendant also
n1oved for a directed verdict (R.97~ lines 28 to R. 98-4
inclusive). The nwtion was denied by the court (R. 98,
5).
At the trial held on February 20th, 1957, a verdict
was returned by the jury finding the defendant guilty of
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the crime of burglary in the 2nd degree, as charged in
the information (R. 119A). A motion for a new trial on
behalf of the defendant was made by his counsel and filed
on February 25th, 1957, on the grounds (1) "That said
verdict is not supported by, and is contrary to the law
on the evidence." (2) "That the court had misdirected the
jury in the nmtters of law, erred in the decisions of questions of law arising during the cour.se of the trial, and
allowed acts (facts) in the cause prejudicial to the
rights of the defendant." On said day, to wit: February
25th, 1957, the court denied the defendant's motion for
a new trial, (R. 121) from which motion the defendant
prosecutes this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY IN THE
SE.COND DEGREE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY IN THE
SE.COND DEGREE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

In State v. Hutchings, 84 Pac. 893, this court said:
"Under the law it was encumbent upon the
jury to acquit the defendant, if the evidence relied
upon could be reconciled upon any reasonable
hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
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defendant. Especially is this rule applicable,
where as here, it is sought to convict the accused
wholly upon circumstantial evidence, and where
the circumstances leave the mind in grave doubt
as to the commission of the offense ; there being
no direct proof of the corpus delicti."
The gist of the defendant's defense is that hi.:;
presence in the building, alleged to have been burglarized,
taken alone, is not sufficient to warrant a conviction of
burglary in the second degree, especially in view of the
fact the defendant had been drinking beer all day long,
at the time of the alleged offense and was not in full
control of his mental faculties. Unless there was an
intent on the part of the defendant to commit larceny
within the building in which he is alleged to have entered,
there could be no commission of the crime as charged.
In Volume No. 1913C, American Annotated Cases,
Page 517, the following is found:
"It is an essential element of the crime of
burglary that breaking and entering should be accompanied with an intent to steal or to commit
some felony."
On page 518 of the same report the following is
found:
"Burglary consists of .an intent, which must
be executed, to break in the night time into a
dwelling house; and further, concurrent intent,
which may be executed or not, to con1mit therein
some crime which is in law a felony."
Bishop on Criminal Law quoted in State v. Meche,
( 42 Lousiana Annotated 273)
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"In these, and other like cases, the particular,
or ulterior, intent must be proved, in .addition to
the more general one, in order to make out the
offense, and nothing will answer as a substitute."
It is the contention of the defendant herein that no
intent on the part of the defendant was proved by the
State to make out a conviction since his unexplained presence in the building could not affirm that he w,a,s within
the building for the purpose of committing the crime of
larceny as charged in the information.

In Black v. State (18 Texas Appeals 124) the court
stated:
"Evidence that a felony was actually committed is evidence that the house w.as broken and
entered with intent to commit that offense, was
the rule at common law. With us, however, the
intent in burglary, is the essence of the offense,
and fact; not, in deed, by expressed and positive
testimony, but the best evidence of which the case
is susceptible. That a breaking and entry of a
house may and could occur without ,a violation of
our statute against burglary needs no argument to
prove or demonstrate. It might easily be suggested that many breakings and entry into houses
occur and do occur in which no intent to commit
either a felony or a crime of theft ever entered
the mind of the party making the entry."

State v. Cowell (12 Nevada 337), holds:

"It should be born in mind that in order to
constitute the crime of burglary, the defendant
must not only enter some one of the structures
mentioned in the statutes at the time and in the
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manner therein stated, but he must enter with intent to commit .some one of the crimes specified.
It is just as essential to prove intent as it is the
entry. If both are not proven to the satisfaction
of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt there can
be no conviction. The Quo Animo constitutes an
indispensable part of this crime, just as scienter
does in forgery and counterfeiting; and the rule
of evidence governing proof of each is the same.''
In the case of White v. State, a Texas case, 1938,
113 S. W. 2nd, 530, the court stated:
"To sustain a conviction on circumstantial evidence, circumstances must be such as to e.stablish
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt
and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis
consistent with his innocence."
In Sullivan v. State, (7 Oklahoma Crilninal, 307; 123
Pacific, 569), the court held :
"In .an indictment or inforn1ation charging
burglary, it is necessary for the allegation of intent to be set out fully, in order to describe the
crime, and the acts necessary to constitute the
crime. It is not sufficient to say the accused intended to steal or intended to conunit a felony
therein."
In State r. Cranford, a Ftah case. X ove1nber 'ith,
1921, 201 Pacific, 1030, this court held:
"The defendant n1ust be accorded the benefit
of every reasonable doubt, and, in cases solely
dependent on rircun1st.antial eYidence, the circumstances n1ust be such as to exclude eyen~ reason·
able h~vpothesis except that of guilt."
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In People v. Kennedy, (55 Calif. 201) the Supreme
Court of California held:
"The intent must be proved, just as any other
fact of the case must be proved, by positive evidence, or by positive evidence of fact, from which
the intent can be inferred."
In State v. JJierritt, (Utah case, June 9th, 1926,
Pacific, 497) this court held :

~-±7

''To warrant conviction, circumstantial evidence must convince the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that all facts and circumstances are true,
and are incompatable with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused."
In State v. Wells (100 Pacific 681, 35 Utah 400) this
court held:
"In circumstantial evidence, circumstances
must be proved which not only agree with, and
concur to show, defendant's guilt, but are inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion."'
In State v. Adamson, 125 Pacific 2nd 429, on page
430 of the Report this court said:
"A criminal case requires proof of each element of the crime by evidence that convinces one
beyond all reasonable doubts of the existence of
each such element."
In State v. Cohn, 232 Pacific 2nd 470, 171 Kansas
344, the Kansas Supreme Court stated as follows:
"Where the state relies on circumstantial
evidence to establish guilt of defendant, evidence
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must be so strong that every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant is excluded."
In the case of State v. Clark, 223 Pacific 2nd 184,
this court stated:
"A criminal case requires proof of each element of the crime by evidence that convinces one
beyond all reasonable doubt of the existence of
each such element."
State v. Lawrence, 234 Pacific 2nd 600, where this
court held:

"A plea of not guilty by defendant in prosecution for grand larceny of automobile, passed on
the state the burden of proving every essential
element of the offense by evidence sufficient to
convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."
"In criminal cases, the state has the burden
of proving every essential element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, and both as to proof
of the state's case, and as to matters of defense,
all that is necessary to entitle the defendant to
acquittal is that there exists reasonable doubt as
to his guilt."
State v. Ilendricks, 258 Pacific 2nd ±5:2, a rtah case,
holds:

"Rule that all that is necessary to entitle a
defendant to an acquittal is that there exists a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, applies whether
the defendant offers any evidence or not."
In PcojJlc v. Smith, :275 Pacific 2nd 919, 1:28 Calif.
Appeals 2nd 706, also People v. Rascon, :274 Pacific 2nd
899, 128 California Appeals 2nd 118, the court holds:
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"Evidence that merely raises suspiCIOn, no
matter how strong, of guilt of the person charged
with a crime is not sufficient to sustain a verdict
and judgment against him."
In State v. Darlene Osmus, a Wyoming case, 276
Pacific 2nd 469 :
"Speculation, suspicion, surmises and guesses
have no evidentiary value."
CONCLUSION

It is contended by the defendant that the mere fact
that he was seen emerging from a broken window of the
Star Brass Foundry and Refining Company building,
located at 8th South and 4th West, on the night of June
lOth, 1956 is not sufficient to warrant the jury finding
that he was within the building and had gone into the
building with the intention to commit larceny as charged
in the information, but on the other hand the rule of law
applicable to the circumstances involved that the jury
may well have found upon a reasonable hypothesis that
he was in there for some innocent purpose other than that
of committing larceny. There is no evidence that anything was taken from the building, no evidence that ,anything was stolen, or missed in the inventory. At most the
only thing that the defendant could be guilty of is a
simple trespass, and the evidence does not warrant the
jury in finding under these circumstances, that he entered
the building with the intention to commit larceny, and
thereby exclude every other hypothesis as to his innocence.
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It appears .at most, that, under the instructions given
by the court, the jury concluded that the defendant had
entered the building of the said Star Brass Foundry &
Refining Company on said night to commit larceny based
on mere suspicion, speculation and guess as to why he
had entered the building, and the jury could have reasonably found that he entered for son1e innocent purpose
other than that charged in the information. His mere
unexplained presence within the building and his emergence from the building in the presence of the police
officers does not warrant the jury in excluding every
other hypothesis of his innocence, and finding that he had
only entered the building for the purpose of committing
the larceny.
In the case of Ashford v. State, a K ebraska case, 53
N orwestern 1036, on page 1037 of the report the court
states:
"Again there is no evidence as to the intent
with which the breaking and entering was done.
It is charged in the infor1nation that the~T were
made with the intent to steal and carry away the
goods and chattels of J ettie Reynolds. That
such was the purpose will not be presu1ned from
the mere fact of breaking and entering into the
building. It is conceded that nothing was stolen
therefr01u by the defendant. Had there been,
then, fron1 that fact, it 1night be inferred that the
object and purpose of the accused was larceny.
since the presun1ption is that eyery sane person
is presu1ned to have intended that which his acts
indicate his intentions to have been."
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It is respectfully submitted therefore by the defend-

ant that his mere presence within the building and emergence from the building through a broken window does
not constitute sufficient evidence to warrant the jury
finding him guilty of entering therein with intent to
commit larceny to the exclusion of every other reasonable
hypothesis. Since nothing was taken from the building
his mere presence within the same cannot conclusively
be relied upon as to an intention to enter therein to ste.al,
commit theft or larceny. For what purpose the defendant entered the building cannot be presumed upon these
facts alone as one with the intent to commit larceny.
There may be other reasonable hypothesis for the jury
to find the defendant entered with innocent purposes,
perhaps to seclude himself from his quarreling and arguing wife, or bec.ause he was under the influence of intoxicants, and was not capable of formulating any felonious
intent, or to seclude himself from the rest of the party
with whom he was with, or for the purpose of using a
toilet. It is the contention that his presence in the building with the intent to commit larceny therein has not
been proved by the State. That state's c.ase wholly fails
in this regard as gathered from the facts and circumstances of this case. He should be given every benefit
and intendment of the law that his presence within the
building constituted merely a simple civil trespass, and
that the state has failed to prove an intent to break in
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and enter the building with the intent to commit la1·ceny
therein as charged in the information.
Respectfully submitted,

GLEN S. HATCH
A. 1\L MARSDEN
Attorneys for Appellant and
Defendant
616 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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